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Synopsis
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE IMMIGRATION
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
1978-1979
INTRODUCTION
This Comment will focus on recent developments in the field of
immigration law from October, 1978, to October, 1979. The discus-
sion of the developments in the immigration laws will include se-
lected legislative enactments and regulations promulgated
pursuant to such enactments, important judicial decisions, signifi-
cant administrative actions taken by the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service (INS) and the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), and proposed legislation. This Comment should serve as a
brief summary of current events and as a guide to further re-
search in the immigration laws of the United States.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIoNs
Since October, 1978, the Supreme Court has rendered decisions
in two cases' and denied certiorari in a third.2 In Ambach v.
Norwick,3 the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute forbid-
ding the permanent certification as a public school teacher of any
person who is not a United States citizen unless that person has
1. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170
(1978).
2. Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
1993 (1979).
3. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
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manifested an intention to apply for citizenship. 4 Petitioners 5
filed suit seeking to enjoin enforcement of the statute as violative
of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.6
In this five-to-four decision, the Court continued to read expan-
sively the "governmental function" principle7 applied to New
York State troopers in Foley v. Connelie.8 The "governmental
function" principle requires that state legislation which discrimi-
nates on the basis of alienage be judged by the rational relation-
ship test rather than by the close judicial scrutiny standard
normally applied to such legislation.9 Because of the obligation of
teachers to promote civic virtues and an understanding of the role
of citizens in our society, the majority concluded that New York
had a rational basis for limiting the participation of noncitizens in
teaching in the public schools.O Justice Blackmun, writing for
the dissent, queried whether a good noncitizen teacher is better
than a bad citizen teacher and whether it is preferable to have a
teacher experienced in the culture and life of another country
than one who has never seen another country." The dissenters
criticized the New York statute as drawing an irrational distinc-
tion, stating, "The State will know how to select its teachers
responsibly, wholly apart from citizenship, and can do so selec-
tively and intelligently.... An artificial citizenship bar is not a
rational way."' 2
In a similar action, the Supreme Court, in Vergara v. Hamp-
ton,'3 denied a petition for certiorari,14 which had asked the
4. N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 3001(3) (McKinney 1970).
5. Petitioner Norwick was a native of Scotland and a subject of Great Britain
who was married to a U.S. citizen and had been a resident since 1965. Petitioner
Dachinger was a Finnish subject who came to the U.S. in 1966 and was maried to
a U.S. citizen. Both teachers met all the educational requirements for certification
as public school teachers prescribed by New York law and were eligible for natu-
ralization, but they consistently refused to seek U.S. citizenship. 441 U.S. at 71.
6. Id.
7. As a general principle some state functions are so bound up with the
operation of the State as a governmental entity as to permit exclusion
from those functions of all persons who have not become part of the proc-
ess of self-government. Accordingly, a State is required to justify its ex-
clusion of aliens from such governmental positions only "by a showing of
some rational relationship between the interest sought to be protected
and the limiting classification."
Id. at 1590. See also Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
8. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
9. Id. at 74.
10. 441 U.S. at 81.
11. Id. at 87. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined in the dissent.
12. Id. at 87-88.
13. 581 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1993 (1979).
14. The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari is not a judgment on the merits
as an affirmance or a reversal would be, but it does end the question in the Sev-
enth Circuit.
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Court to review the decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.' 5 That decision had sustained the validity of Executive Or-
der No. 11935,16 which barred lawfully admitted permanent
resident aliens from federal competitive civil service.17
The plaintiffs in Vergara'8 filed a class action, challenging the
Executive Order as exceeding the authority of the President.
They also claimed the order was violative of their civil rights19
and a denial of due process. The district court denied class action
status. The court of appeals found that the plaintiffs had estab-
lished the prerequisites for a class action. However, the court dis-
missed the appeal holding that the President had not exceeded
his authority, the Executive order did not violate plaintiffs' civil
rights, and it did not deny them due process. 2 0
Another decision rendered by the Supreme Court is of far-
reaching significance to both aliens and citizens. In Califano v.
Aznavorian,2 1 the Court upheld the constitutionality of section
1611(f) of the Social Security Act, which precludes payment of
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits for any month
15. 581 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 905 (1979).
16. 41 Fed. Reg. 37,301 (1976).
17. In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), the Supreme Court held
that a United States Civil Service Commission regulation barring lawfully admit-
ted permanent resident aliens from competitive civil service deprived them of an
important liberty without due process of law. The decision was narrowly drawn,
based on the lack of power in the Civil Service Commission, but assuming without
deciding that the same bar would not be unconstitutional if imposed by Congress
or the President. The President promptly issued Exec. Order No. 11935 on Sep-
tember 2, 1976, renewing the bar.
As justification for Exec. Order No. 11935, President Ford stated:
I have concluded that it is in the national interest to preserve the long-
standing policy of generally prohibiting the employment of aliens from po-
sitions in the competitive service, except where the efficiency of the serv-
ice or the national interest dictate otherwise in specific cases or
circumstances. It is also my judgment that it would be detrimental to the
efficiency of the civil service, as well as contrary to the national interest,
precipitously to employ aliens in the competitive service without an ap-
propriate determination that it is in the national interest to do so.
41 Fed. Reg. 37,301, 37,303 (1976).
18. The plaintiffs were three permanent resident aliens who desired to take
civil service examinations for federal employment. 581 F.2d at 1282.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws ......
20. 581 F.2d at 1281-82.
21. 439 U.S. 170 (1978).
which the recipient spends outside the United States.22
The plaintiff, an American citizen eligible for SSI benefits, left
the United States on July 21, 1974, and traveled to Mexico. Be-
cause of an unexpected illness, she remained in Mexico until Sep-
tember 21, 1974. Accordingly, she did not receive benefits for
August or September. Asserting that the suspension of her bene-
fits denied her due process, equal protection, and the right of in-
ternational travel,23 she sought declaratory relief as well as the
benefits she had been denied because of her visit to Mexico. 24
The district court granted plaintiff summary judgment.25 On ap-
peal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 1611(f)
has only an incidental effect on international travel and clearly ef-
fectuates the basic congressional intention to limit SSI payments
to residents of the United States. 26
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR CERTIFICATIONS
Two major pieces of legislation have been enacted which affect
the employment of aliens. The Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act (CETA) Amendments of 197827 proscribe the use of
CETA28 funds for employment of certain aliens. The Outer Conti-
nental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) Amendments of 197829 reflect a
growing public and congressional concern about the employment
of undocumented aliens in drilling operations on the Outer Conti-
nental Shelf.
Several provisions of the CETA amendments are of special in-
terest. The amendments limit the use of CETA funds to "citizens
and nationals of the United States, lawfully admitted permanent
resident aliens, and lawfully admitted refugees and parolees."30
Use of funds for the employment of any other persons is ex-
pressly prohibited.31 The amendments also limit membership in
the Young Adult Conservation Corps to citizens or lawfully ad-
mitted permanent residents of the United States or lawfully ad-
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(f) (1976).
23. 439 U.S. at 172.
24. Id. at 172-73.
25. 440 F. Supp. 788, 797 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 439 U.S. 170 (1978).
26. 439 U.S. 170 (1978). The Court stated, "While these justifications for the
legislation may not be compelling, its constitutionality, in contrast to the stan-
dards applied to laws that penalize the right of interstate travel, does not depend
on compelling justifications." Id. at 174.
27. Pub. L No. 95-524, 92 Stat. 1909 (1978).
28. Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 801-992
(1976).
29. Pub. L No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978).
30. CETA Amendments § 132(e), 29 U.S.C. § 834(e) (West Supp. 1979).
31. Id. § 121(p), 29 U.S.C.A. § 823(p) (West Supp. 1979).
[VOL. 17: 173, 19791 Synopsis
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
mitted refugees and parolees.32
The pertinent provision of the OSCLA amendments directs the
Secretary of Transportation to develop regulations which require
that "any vessel . . . or other vehicle . .. be manned or crewed
. . . by citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted
for permanent residence. '33 However, if there are not sufficient
numbers of citizens or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent
residence who are qualified and available for such work34 or if cit-
izens of a foreign country have a right to control or own over fifty
percent of the equipment, an exemption from the citizenship or
permanent residency requirement is available.35
A number of bills relating to the employment of aliens have
been introduced in the Congress. Several bills attempt to facili-
tate the admission of aliens for temporary employment as a way
to stem the tide of illegal entries. 36 Other proposals seek amend-
ments to the Internal Revenue Code which would disallow deduc-
tions from gross income for salary paid to aliens illegally
employed in the United States. 37 Two significant proposals at-
tempt to impose criminal penalties on those who employ illegal
aliens.38 These congressional attempts to legislate against the
employment of illegal aliens are particularly important. Previous
attempts to enact legislation penalizing the employers of illegal
aliens not authorized to work have failed.39 Currently, an alien
who engages in unauthorized employment does not commit a
criminal offense and the employer of the alien is not in violation
32. Id. § 803(b) (1) (C), 29 U.S.CA. § 993(b) (1) (C) (West Supp. 1979).
33. OCSLA Amendments § 30(a) (3), 43 U.S.C.A § 1356(a) (3) (West Supp.
1979).
34. Id. § 30(c) (1), 43 U.S.C. § 1356(c) (1) (West Supp. 1979).
35. Id. § 30(c) (2), 43 U.S.C-.A § 1356(c) (2) (West Supp. 1979).
36. H.R. 326, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H165 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979);
H.R. 405, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H167 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979); H.R.
800, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H179 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979); H.R. 2213,
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H692 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 1979).
37. H.R. 244, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H163 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979);
H.R. 2214, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H692 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 1979).
38. H.R. 225, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H163 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979);
H.R. 1517, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H316 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1979).
39. H.R. 16188, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REC. 28, 972 (1972); H.R. 982, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 504 (1975); S. 3074, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG.
REC. 5360 (1976). However, 7 U.S.C. § 2045(f) (1976) prohibits labor contractors
from knowingly recruiting aliens who are not lawful permanent residents or who
have not been authorized by the Attorney General to accept employment. (Sub-
section (f) added by Pub. L No. 93-518, § 11(a), 88 Stat. 1655 (1974)).
of federal law.40
Numerous decisions have been rendered in the area of employ-
ment and labor certifications by the federal courts, the INS and
BIA, and the Department of Labor.4m Three federal court deci-
sions are of particular importance.42
In Mukadam v. United States Department of Labor,43 the Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York rejected the gov-
ernment's contention that an alien who is an unsuccessful
applicant for labor certification lacks standing to sue for judicial
review of that determination. The government asserted that only
the prospective employer has standing to sue.44
The court held that the government's analysis of section
212 (a) (14) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) was un-
duly narrow. When Mukadam filed his application for certifica-
tion, the INA permitted aliens residing in the United States to
apply for third preference status (which requires certification)
without a specific offer of employment.45 The court determined
that at that time "Congress did intend to confer directly on aliens
the right to seek permanent residence without the intercession of
an employer." Thus, it "would be inconsistent with this intent to
limit judicial review of a denial of certification to aliens whose pe-
titions are joined in by an employer when denial of certification
forecloses an alien from seeking a third preference visa."46
In Spyropoulos v. INS,47 the Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit made an important distinction between an alien's representa-
tions at entry respecting his job qualifications and his
representations at entry respecting his intent to take up certified
40. See Bersen, Employment Rights of Aliens Under the Immigration Laws, re-
printed in 56 INTERPRETER RELEASES 240 (1979).
41. The Department of Labor issues administrative decisions on labor certifi-
cations brought before it by aliens seeking employment. Because of the large
number of decisions rendered in the past year, a discussion of these decisions will
not be presented. For digests of the most significant of these decisions, see 56 IN-
TERPRETER RELEASES 48, 311 (1979). See also 56 INTERPRETER RELEASES 321 (1979)
(proposed revisions of the regulations governing the labor certification process).
42. Yui Sing Tse v. INS, 596 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1979); Spyropoulos v. INS, 590
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978); Mukadam v. United States Dep't of Labor, 458 F. Supp. 164
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
43. 458 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The plaintiff, an alien in the U.S. as a non-
immigrant, was seeking third preference status as a member of the professions
(food chemist). His labor certification application, filed in his own behalf in 1975,
was ultimately denied on the ground that U.S. workers were available. He filed an
action in the district court to set aside the denial as an abuse of discretion.
44. Id. at 167.
45. INA, § 203(a), as amended by Act of October 20, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571,
§ 4, 90 Stat. 2705.
46. 458 F. Supp. at 167.
47. 590 F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1978).
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employment. Petitioner, a Canadian citizen, received a job offer
to work in Washington, D.C., as a cabinetmaker. On this basis a
labor certification was issued. The United States Consul issued
an immigrant visa to petitioner despite the fact that he failed to
bring a letter from his prospective employer indicating that the
job was still available. Petitioner immediately proceeded to Mas-
sachusetts where he took employment as a woodworker and a
machinist.48
Deportation procedures were initiated charging that petitioner
was deportable under section 241(a) (1) of the INA49 because he
was inadmissible at entry under section 212(a) (14)..50 Both the
immigration judge and the BIA found petitioner deportable.5l
On appeal, petitioner contended that the finding of deportability
amounted to a collateral attack on the validity of the labor certifi-
cation, which is beyond the power of the INS unless included in a
fraud charge under section 212(a) (19).52 The court disagreed,
stating that the validity of the labor certification was not in issue.
The court found that petitioner may have had a valid certificate
for a job in Washington, D.C., but the evidence indicated that he
did not intend to take the job. Therefore, he entered to do uncer-
tified labor, and a decision that he was deportable in no way im-
pugns the Secretary of Labor's decision to certify him for work in
Washington.5 3
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Yui Sing Tse v. INS5
held that a labor certification as a Chinese specialty cook is valid
for adjustment of status purposes if both the employer and the
alien contemplate, at the time of the certification, a continuing
48. Id. at 2.
49. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1) (1976).
50. Id. § 1182(a) (14).
51. Both found that petitioner knew or should have known that there were
problems with his certified job, 'that he failed to take reasonable steps to deter-
mine whether or not the certified job was still available, and that he almost imme-
diately took up uncertified employment. The BIA found that these facts amounted
to clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence that he entered to perform uncerti-
fled labor. 590 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978).
52. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (19) (1976). See also Casteneda-Gonzalez v. INS, 564 F.2d
417 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
53. 590 F.2d at 3-4.
54. 596 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1979). By way of dictum, the court indicated that the
labor certification was still valid, even though the alien had changed employment
in the interim. The certified job was being held open and the alien and the certi-
fied employer both intended that the alien would return to the certified employ-
ment prior to or upon grant of adjustment of status. Id. at 833 nn. 2 & 3.
employer-employee relationship, notwithstanding the alien's in-
tent to ultimately practice dentistry.55 The immigration judge de-
nied adjustment because the petitioner was no longer working for
the certified employer. On appeal the BIA affirmed, but on the
ground that the petitioner was ineligible because he planned to
become a dentist rather than to continue as a cook.56
The court of appeals reversed. The court found that it may be
appropriate to require that the alien intend to occupy the certifi-
cated occupation for a period of time that is reasonable in light
both of the interest served by the regulation 57 and the interest in
freedom to change employment. However, the regulation cannot
be construed to limit the freedom to strive for self-improvement.
The court held that the regulation requires only that, at the time
of entry, both the employer and the employee intend that the lat-
ter will be employed in the job upon which the labor certification
is based. That condition was satisfied in this case.58
EXPATRIATION AND NATIONALYr
Major legislation on expatriation and nationality became law on
October 10, 1978. The new law59 repeals certain expatriation sec-
tions of the INA which have been declared unconstitutional or
whose application has been severely limited by Supreme Court
decisions.60
Children born abroad to parents, one of whom is a United
States citizen and the other an alien, are no longer required to be
physically present in the United States for two years between the
ages of fourteen and eighteen, in order to retain the United States
citizenship acquired at birth.61 This retention of citizenship provi-
sion is also no longer applicable to United States citizen children
born abroad of mixed parentage who acquired their citizenship
under prior statutes.62 The residency requirements for retention
of citizenship by dual nationals living abroad were also re-
pealed.63 Other provisions of the INA which were repealed re-
quired expatriation of the following: citizens who vote in a
55. Id. at 835.
56. Id. at 833 & n.3.
57. 8 C.F.R. § 204.4(b) (1979).
58. 596 F.2d at 835.
59. Pub. L No. 95-432, 92 Stat. 1046 (1978).
60. [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2521.
61. INA, Pub. L No. 95-432, § 1, 92 Stat. 1046 (1978). [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2522-24.
62. INA, Pub. L No. 95-432, § 1, 92 Stat. 1046 (1978). [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2522-24.
63. INA, Pub. L No. 95-432, § 1, 92 Stat. 1046 (1978). [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2522-24.
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foreign political election,64 soldiers who are convicted of desertion
in time of war by court martial,65 and naturalized citizens residing
abroad.66
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the expatriation
case of Terrazas v. Vance.67 In Terrazas, the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit held that if the government asserts that expa-
triation has occurred, it has the burden of proving by clear, con-
vincing, and unequivocal evidence not only that the expatriating
act took place, but also that it was performed voluntarily.68 In so
holding, the court struck down as unconstitutional under the four-
teenth amendment the provision of section 349(c) of the INA
which requires proof of the expatriating act by a preponderance
of the evidence and presumes that the citizen acted voluntarily
unless he can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his
actions were involuntary.69 The court relied on Afroyim v. Rusk,70
which held that the fourteenth amendment protects every United
States citizen against congressional forcible destruction of his cit-
izenship.
VISA PREFERENCES
Two major pieces of legislation that were passed by Congress
and signed into law by the President affect the policy of the
United States governing visa preferences. Congress enacted Pub-
lic Law No. 95-41271 on October 5, 1978,72 establishing a new
64. INA, Pub. L. No. 95-432, § 2, 92 Stat. 1046 (1978). [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2525. See also Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S.253 (1967) (declared § 349(a) (5)
of the INA unconstitutional).
65. INA, Pub. I. No. 95-432, § 2, 92 Stat. 1046 (1978). [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2525. See also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (declared § 349(a) (8) of
the INA unconstitutional).
66. INA, Pub. L. No. 95-432, § 2, 92 Stat. 1046 (1978). [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2525. See also Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964) (declared § 352 of
the INA unconstitutional).
67. 577 F.2d 7 (7th Cir. 1978), prob. juris. noted, 442 U.S. 927 (1979). The case
will not be scheduled for oral argument until sometime during the 1979 term,
which begins in October. If the Supreme Court agrees with the decision below
and it is given retroactive effect, the validity of thousands of past administrative
determinations of loss of nationality could be open to challenge.
68. Id.
69. 8U.S.C.§1481(c) (1976).
70. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
71. 92 Stat. 907 (1978).
72. Because the Act contained no delayed effective date, it went into effect im-
mediately upon being signed by the President on October 4, 1978. Sponsors of the
Act had hoped to have it effective prior to September 30, 1978, the end of the fiscal
worldwide immigration ceiling of 290,000 persons. The former
worldwide immigration ceiling was broken up into an Eastern
Hemisphere limitation of 170,000 and a Western Hemisphere limi-
tation of 120,000.73 The other significant provision of the Act es-
tablishes a Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee
Policy.74 The Commission will study and evaluate existing laws,
policies, and procedures governing the admission of immigrants
and refugees to the United States and will make appropriate rec-
ommendations to Congress and the President.75
Recently proposed legislation contains sections which, if
passed, would modify the new law on visa preferences. The Ad-
ministration's refugee bill, which has been introduced in both the
House and the Senate, would reduce the worldwide immigration
ceiling, exclusive of refugees, to 270,000 annually. Included in this
proposal, however, are provisions to accept as many as 50,000 ref-
ugees annually, thus raising the total number of immigrants ad-
mitted into the United States to 320,000 annually.76
The second legislative enactment 77 requires a valid adoption
home-study before granting a nonpreference visa for children
adopted abroad or coming to the United States for adoption by
United States citizens.7 8 A valid adoption home-study must also
be performed before granting an immediate relative immigrant
visa for an adopted child or a child coming for adoption as defined
in section 101(b) (1) (F) of the INA.79 The Act also proscribes the
issuance of a nonpreference visa to an unmarried child under six-
teen, unless that child is accompanied by or following his natural
year, in order to free up some 8,000 refugee numbers as an emergency measure for
use by "Boat People" refugees from Indochina. 56 INTERPRETER RELEASES 296
(1979).
73. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1151(a) (West Supp. 1979). Sections 2 and 3 of the Act, id.
§ 1152(c), remove references to separate quotas in §§ 202(c) and 203(a) of the INA.
See also H.R. REP. No. 1206, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2261-62. Section 5 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (West Supp.
1979), provides that any refugee, not otherwise eligible for retroactive adjustment
of status, who was or is paroled in under § 212(d) (5) of the INA prior to Septem-
ber 30, 1980, shall have his status adjusted pursuant to the provisions of § 203(g)
and (h). Since (g) and (h) contain no provision for a charge to a quota, this provi-
sion will enable refugee parolees already here and those refugees who will be pa-
roled prior to September 30, 1980, to become permanent residents without charge
to the worldwide limitation.
74. Pub. L No. 95-412, § 4, 92 Stat. 907 (1978).
75. Id. § 4(c), 92 Stat. 907.
76. S. 643, 96th Cong., 1st. Sess., 125 CONG. Rsc. 2630 (1979); H.R. 2816, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 1326 (1979).
77. Pub. L No. 95-417, 92 Stat. 917 (1978). Regulations promulgated pursuant
to Pub. L. No. 95-417 may be found at 44 Fed. Reg. 5059 (1979).
78. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a) (8) (A) (West Supp. 1979).
79. Id. § 1154(e).
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parent.80 The measure removes the limitation of two petitions per
family to grant immigration benefits to alien adopted children,
now contained in section 204(c) of the INA.81 Other sections of
this new law deal with the naturalization of adopted children and
will be discussed in the next section.
NATURALIZATION AND DENATURALIZATION
The naturalization laws pertaining to the naturalization of
adopted children and the English language requirement for the
naturalization of certain persons have been legislatively modified.
Public Law No. 95-41782 liberalizes the requirements for naturali-
zation of adopted children. The age under which an alien child
can derive citizenship through the naturalization of his parent or
parents was raised from sixteen to eighteen years of age.8 3
Adopted children also are now eligible for derivative citizenship.8 4
The two-year United States residence and one-year United States
physical presence requirements for adopted children have been
eliminated.8 5
Public Law No. 95.57986 waives the English language require-
ment of section 312 of the INA in the special situation of an alien
who, on the date of filing his naturalization petition, is over fifty
years of age and has been living in the United States for periods
totalling twenty years following a lawful admission for permanent
residence. 87 Prior to this amendment, the English language re-
quirement was waived only for aliens over the age of fifty on the
effective date of the INA (December 24, 1952).88 Thus, an alien
would have to have been at least seventy-five years of age in or-
der to have the English language requirement waived.
Three particularly noteworthy cases were decided in the past
80. Id. § 1153(a) (8) (B). This latter provision cuts off an avenue of immigration
for alien children under 16 who cannot qualify for immediate relative or prefer-
ence status; e.g., a child coming to the United States to live with an uncle. Such a
child did not need a labor certification and was able to qualify for a nonpreference
visa when the preference portion of the quota was open.
81. Id. § 1154(c).
82. See note 77 supra.
83. Id. §§ 1431(a) (1), (2), 1432(a) (4), (5).
84. Id.
85. Id. § 1434 (repealing 8 U.S.C. § 1434 (1976)).
86. 92 Stat. 2474 (1978).
87. [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5549.
88. Id. at 5550.
year. In In re Carelli,8 9 the District Court for the Eastern District
of New York granted naturalization over objection by the natural-
ization examiner. The examiner claimed petitioner was disquali-
fied under section 315 of the INA90 as one who had applied for and
had been relieved from military service on the ground of alien-
age.91
Petitioner was admitted to the United States and registered
with the Selective Service in 1960. On February 26, 1970, he re-
ceived a notice for induction but filed a request for relief from
training and service and the induction notice was cancelled. On
February 24, 1972, he received a IV-C classification as a perma-
nent resident alien exempt from military service. It was during
the time prior to his reclassification that the government intro-
duced the lottery system.92
The naturalization examiner maintained that the citizenship
bar of section 315 became effective when the government reclassi-
fied petitioner IV-C. The court disagreed, however, stating the
fact that an alien who has requested an exemption from service is
at some point given a IV-C classification does not necessarily es-
tablish that the government has fully complied with its part of the
statutory bargain. "To determine whether the government has
performed its part of the agreement one must look at the circum-
stances under which the IV-C exemption was granted in a partic-
ular case."93 Upon examining the record, the court concluded that
in view of the drastic change in circumstances (introduction of
the lottery system), the court would be hard pressed to find that
the grant of permanent exemption from military service to peti-
tioner about two years after his initial request for exemption rep-
resented reasonably prompt performance by the government of
its part of the statutory bargain.94
In United States v. Walus,95 the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois revoked defendant's naturalization on the basis
of defendant's concealed criminal activities as a member of the
Gestapo during World War II. The government fied the denatu-
ralization complaint in 1976 charging that Walus' United States
citizenship was illegally procured because obtained by conceal-
89. 466 F. Supp. 272 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
90. 8 U.S.C. § 1426 (1976).
91. 466 F. Supp. at 272.
92. Id. at 274.
93. Id. at 276.
94. Id. at 277. See S. 1217, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 8420 (daily ed.
Sept. 24, 1979). This proposal would amend the INA and renders aliens who have
been relieved of U.S. military service obligation eligible for citizenship if their mili-
tary exemption was pursuant to a treaty or other international agreement.
95. 453 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. MI1. 978).
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ment of material facts and willful misrepresentation and because
Walus lacked the good moral character required for United States
citizenship.9 6
Walus asserted the statute of limitations as an affirmative de-
fense, denied all the allegations in the complaint, and demanded a
jury trial. He claimed that the Nazis had arrested him at the age
of seventeen and forced him into labor on various farms. 97
The court rejected Walus' arguments, holding that because a
denaturalization proceeding is an equitable and not a legal one,
there is no right to a jury trial.98 The court further stated that
there was no applicable statute of limitations in this situation be-
cause, under section 340 of the INA, citizenship illegally obtained
is void at its inception.99 Based on the evidence presented, the
court rejected Walus' defense of coercion as a weak alibi and re-
voked his naturalization.100
In a similar case, United States v. Fedorenko,101 the government
filed a denaturalization complaint against the defendant, charging
that his naturalization was procured illegally and by willful mis-
representations and concealment of material facts. The defend-
ant admitted that on his visa application he failed to reveal his
service as a concentration camp guard during the war. A Foreign
Service officer testified that if the defendant had revealed his con-
centration camp position the visa would not have been issued but
further investigation would have been needed to determine his
admissibility. 0 2
The district court entered judgment for the defendant, finding
that defendant had not voluntarily served as a concentration
camp guard.1 0 3 The court concluded that the misstatements in
the visa application had not been shown to be material under the
criteria laid down in Chaunt v. United States.10 4 Thus, adhering
to the interpretation adopted by the Third and Ninth Circuits, the
court held that a suppressed fact is material only if the truth
96. Id. at 700-01.
97. Id. at 702.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 716.
100. Id. at 703-16.
101. 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979).
102. Id.
103. United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 913-14 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd,
597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979).
104. 364 U.S. 350 (1960).
would have justified denial.105
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that
the district court had misconstrued the Chaunt test of material-
ity.106 In Chaunt, the Supreme Court had held that a misrepre-
sentation or concealment was material only if the government
proved "either (1) that facts were suppressed which, if known,
would have warranted denial of citizenship or (2) that their dis-
closure might have been useful in an investigation possibly lead-
ing to the discovery of other facts warranting denial of
citizenship."107 The court concluded that the evidence, although
insufficient to satisfy the first Chaunt test, was adequate under
the second because if the defendant had disclosed his guard serv-
ice, the authorities would have conducted an inquiry that might
have resulted in denial of a visa.108
FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN AGRICULTURE
In order to keep a watchful eye on the growing number of alien
investors in United States agricultural land, Public Law No. 95-
460109 was approved. This new Act requires any foreign person
who acquires or transfers any interest, other than a security inter-
est, in agricultural land to submit a report to the Secretary of Ag-
riculture within ninety days after acquisition or transfer of the
land.11o Civil penalities will be imposed for failure to submit a re-
port or for proffering false information in a report."' The Act re-
quires the Secretary of Agriculture to formulate and submit
reports to the President, the Congress, and the states. These re-
ports will analyze the effects, particularly on family farms and ru-
ral communities, of such transactions and holdings."l 2
105. 455 F. Supp. at 915-16.
106. 597 F.2d at 951.
107. 364 U.S. at 355.
108. 597 F.2d at 953.
109. 92 Stat. 1263 (1978). See S. 194, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 435
(1979). This proposal, submitted by Senator McGovern, seeks to regulate and con-
trol the acquistion of United States agricultural land by foreign persons. This pro-
posal would seem to indicate a fear that if too much agricultural land is acquired
by foreign investors, the country could be faced with a dependence on foreigners
for food as well as for oil. See also H.R. 3182, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC.
1642 (1979). This proposal would amend the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
to restrict persons who are not citizens of the U.S. from acquiring more than 35%
of the nonvoting securities or more than 5% of the voting securities of any issuer
whose securities are registered under the Act.
110. 7 U.S.C.A. § 3501(a) (West Supp. 1979).
111. Id. § 3502.
112. Id. § 3504.
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FAMILY RELATIONS
Illegitimate Child as Stepchild
In a landmark decision, In re Moreira,"3 the BIA has laid down
new criteria for determining whether a visa petitioner or benefici-
ary qualifies as a "stepchild" within the meaning of section
101(b) (1) (B)."4 In Moreira, the BIA refused to accept as a rule
of general applicability the holding of Andrade v. Esperdy," 5 as
suggested by both petitioner and the INS.116 Andrade held that a
visa petition by the spouse of the natural father of an illegitimate
child on behalf of that child or stepchild can be approved even in
the absence of a showing that they had all lived together in a
close family unit. 1 7
The problem arose because under section 101 (b) (1) (D) of the
INA, an illegitimate child can claim or confer immigration benefits
only in relation to its natural mother and not in relation to its nat-
ural father." 8 The District Court for the Southern District of New
York, in Nation v. Esperdy,"9 fashioned a remedy by recognizing
the spouse of the natural father of the illegitimate child as the
child's stepmother, if the three had lived together as a close fam-
ily unit.120 The same court in Andrade v. Esperdy121 extended the
Nation rule to a situation in which there had never been a close
family unit. However, the BIA had refused to apply that holding
in cases outside the jurisdiction of the court that had rendered
113. LD. No. 2720 (1979).
114. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (1) (B) (1976).
115. 270 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
116. In the Moreira case, the District Director in Philadelphia had denied the
visa petition on a finding that the beneficiary was illegimate and that the peti-
tioner and her husband, the child's natural father, had never lived together with
the child in a close family unit as required by the BIA precedent decisions. On
petitioner's appeal, the INS, in a memorandum dated December 11, 1978, recom-
mended that the Andrade rule be applied nationwide. In a brief order dated Janu-
ary 5, 1979, in which it did not specifically accept the new position taken by the
INS, the BIA remanded to the District Director. The INS, joined by petitioner,
moved for reconsideration asking the BIA to overrule its prior precedents and ac-
cept the Andrade holding that a close family unit need not be shown.
117. 270 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
118. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (1) (D) (1976). This discrimination was sanctioned in Fi-
allo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798-99 (1977).
119. 239 F. Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
120. Id.
121. 270 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
it.122 None of the decisions refusing to follow Andrade appear to
have been challenged in court until Hyppolite v. Sweeney,123 in
which the District Court for the Southern District of Florida en-
dorsed the Andrade holding.
In the Moreira opinion, the BIA reemphasized the need for a
showing of an actual parent-child relationship and agreed that
such a relationship can exist even though the parties may not
have actually lived together as a family unit. On the other hand,
something more than the mere marriage of the spouse to the
child's actual parent must be shown, and this applies if the child
is born in wedlock as well as if the child is illegitimate at birth.124
Specifically, the BIA held that a step-relationship will be recog-
nized for immigration purposes only if the stepparent has shown
an interest in the stepchild's welfare prior to the child's eight-
eenth birthday, either by permitting the child to live in the family
home and caring for him as a parent would or, if the child did not
live with the stepparent, by demonstrating an active parental in-
terest in the child's support, instruction, and general welfare.125
Validity of Marriages
Two recent cases have clarified standards for determining the
validity of marriages for immigration purposes. In Hendrix v.
U.S.LN.S.,126 petitioner was admitted to the United States for per-
manent residence as the unmarried daughter of a United States
122. In re Harris, ID. No. 2308 (1970); In re Amado and Monteiro, 13 L & N. Dec.
179 (1969); In re Soares, 12 I. & N. Dec. 653 (1968).
123. -F. Supp. -, (S.D. Fla., No. 77-1865-Civ. WMH, filed Jan. 6, 1979), digested
in 56 INTERPRETER RELEASES 62 (1979).
124. ID. No. 2720, at 6 (1979).
125. Id. at 7.
Several other Board decisions require clarification in light of today's de-
cision. In Matter of Ferreira, Interim Decision 2645 (BIA 1978), Matter of
Gur, Interim Decision 2560 (BIA 1977), and Matter of Heung, Interim De-
cision 2334 (BIA 1974), visa petitions were filed on behalf of siblings, and
approval was sought on the basis of a common stepparent. In these cases
the child needing the stepparent in order to create the sibling relationship
was legitimate. We therefore approved each visa petition, without inquiry
into whether or not a close family unit has been established. This ap-
proach, insofar as it made a distinction between legitimate and illegiti-
mate stepchildren, was inconsistent with the express terms of the statute,
which speaks of, "a stepchild, whether or not born out of wedlock." Sec-
tion 101(b) (1) (B) of the Act. We hold that, in order for a steprelationship
to be established, there must be a showing that the child, whether legiti-
mate or illegitimate, lived with and was cared for as the child of the step-
parent, or that the stepparent otherwise evinced an active parental
interest in the support, instruction and general welfare of the child. To
the extent that the Ferreira, Gur, and Heung decisions indicate otherwise
with regard to legitimate stepchildren, they are hereby modified.
Id. at 9.
126. 583 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1978).
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citizen. At that time, however, she was married to a citizen of the
Philippines. She was subsequently ordered deported because at
the time of her entry she was not of the status specified in her im-
migrant visa.127 She obtained an annulment of the marriage and
on appeal to the BIA argued that, in light of the annulment, she
was not a married person at the time of entry and was, therefore,
properly admitted. The BIA rejected her appeal. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the BIA decision, refusing
to give retroactive effect to the annulment order.1
28
In the second case, Chan v. Bell,12 9 the District of Columbia
District Court held that a marriage valid at its inception and en-
tered into in good faith is sufficient for visa petition purposes,
notwithstanding an INS conclusion that it is no longer viable. The
District Director had denied an immediate relative visa petition
because plaintiffs ceased living together as husband and wife af-
ter the visa petition had been filed. An appeal to the BIA was dis-
missed.130
The circuit court reversed, holding that section 201 (b)131 and
204(b)132 of the INA were not discretionary and once petitioner
establishes status the benefits are awarded by law.133 The court
disagreed with the Service's contention that a marriage must be
viable not only when the visa petition is ified but also when the
Service renders its decision. The court held that the regulations
do not require the existence of a "viable" marriage as a precondi-
tion to a grant of immediate relative status. 3 4 The court pointed
out that there is no prescribed time limit within which the Service
must take final action on a visa petition. 35 In this case more than
127. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1) (1976).
128. 583 F.2d at 1103-04. The court also refused to apply the sham marriage doc-
trine because applying it to petitioner's situation would result in manipulation of
the immigration laws, which the doctrine seeks to prevent.
129. 464 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1978).
130. Id. at 126-27.
131. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1976). '"The immediate relatives referred to in subsec-
tion (a) of this section shall mean the children, spouses and parents of a citizen of
the United States...."
132. Id. § 1154(b). This section provides for investigation by the Attorney Gen-
eral and approval of the visa petition if he finds the facts stated in the petition to
be true.
133. 464 F. Supp. at 128 & n. 7.
134. Id. at 128-30. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c) (2) (1979) requires that a petition for classi-
fication to immediate relative status be accompanied only by a certificate of mar-
riage and proof of the legal termination of all previous marriages.
135. 464 F. Supp. at 132.
thirty months had elapsed between the filing of the petition and
the final administrative ruling.136
In addition, the construction proposed would have vested in the
Service an unreasonably wide and essentially unreviewable dis-
cretion to determine which marriages are viable.137
STUDENT VISAS
Important changes in the immigration regulations concerning
students became effective on January 1, 1979.138 Under the new
regulations, nonimmigrant students will be admitted for the dura-
tion of their status as students.139 This will eliminate the need for
nonimmigrant students to apply each year for extension of stay.
Nonimmigrant students presently in the United States will be
granted duration of status upon application for extension of stay
if anticipated schooling will require more than one year to com-
plete.140
The new regulations also govern nonimmigrant students seek-
ing to qualify for off-campus employment by establishing the fol-
lowing prerequisites:
(1) The student is in good standing as a student carrying a full course of
study; (2) the student has demonstrated economic necessity due to un-
foreseen circumstances arising subsequent to entry; (3) the student has
demonstrated that acceptance of employment will not interfere with his or
her studies; (4) the student has agreed that employment while school is in
session will not exceed 20 hours per week and (5) the student has sub-
mitted to an authorized official of the school the proper form.141
The Service hopes that the new regulations will facilitate the ad-
mission of nonimmigrant students and reduce the Service's adju-
dicative workload, while providing adequate immigration controls
of persons in the United States on student visas.142
In Mashi v. INS,143 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
laid down a number of important rulings which will be helpful in
applying the law relating to maintenance of status by nonimmi-
grant students. Mashi involved a native and citizen of Iran who
was admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant student in
1975. Midway through the fall, 1975, semester, he participated in a
political demonstration and was arrested for demonstrating with-
out a permit. The arrest culminated in a twelve-day incarceration
136. Id. at 127.
137. Id. at 132.
138. 43 Fed. Reg. 54,618 (1978).
139. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f) (2) (1979).
140. Id. § 214.2(f) (5).
141. Id. § 214.2(f) (6).
142. See note 138 supra.
143. 585 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1978).
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pursuant to an INS "hold order." Because of a large number of
absences, petitioner voluntarily withdrew from one of his courses
upon his return to school.44 The INS promptly initiated deporta-
tion proceedings under section 241 (a) (9) of the INA,145 charging
that he had failed to pursue a full course of study. By completing
only ten units of the fall semester, it was alleged, he was not
meeting the twelve-hour minimum course load required by the
Code of Federal Regulations.146 The immigration judge found
him deportable and granted voluntary departure. The BIA af-
firmed. 47
The court of appeals reversed, pointing out that the twelve-
credit rule was added by amendment in 1975 and does not apply
to aliens such as petitioner, who were admitted as nonimmigrant
students before January 1, 1976. As to such students, the regula-
tions require merely that they continue to carry not less than
what the school considers to be a full course of study and other-
wise continue to maintain student status.148 The school never re-
ported, as required under the regulations, that the petitioner
failed to carry a full course of study or failed to attend classes to
the extent normally required. The court concluded, therefore,
that petitioner had otherwise maintained his student status by
completing twenty-nine units in two semesters plus two sessions
of summer school. 49
The court was critical of the BIA's interpretation that the regu-
lation required deportation solely because the petitioner had
dropped the course before the end of the semester to avoid a fail-
ing grade. The petitioner would not have been deportable if he
had continued with the course futilely to the end.'50 Also criti-
cized was the INS "hold order," which led to the incarceration
that the BIA held was "meaningfully disruptive of the pursuit of
petitioner's academic studies."' 5 ' The court noted that in one of
the Board's own decisions, Neeley v. Whylie, 5 2 the Board held
that:
144. Id. at 1311.
145. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (9) (1976).
146. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f) (1) (a) (1979).
147. 585 F.2d at 1312.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1313.
150. Id. at 1314.
151. Id. at 1315.
152. 11 L & N. Dec. 864 (1966).
In the absence of a definition, by statute or regulations, of acts which con-
stitute a violation of nonimmigrant status, each case must be looked into
on its own facts, and the decision arrived at should strike a fair balance
between the character of the act committed and the consequences which
will flow from it. 15 3
The court urged the Service in the future to follow its own recom-
mendation that deportation statutes be liberally construed in
favor of the alien. 5 4
DEPORTATION AND IMiIGRATION PROCEDURES
Public Law No. 95-549,155 which became law on October 30, 1978,
amends the INA to provide for the exclusion and deportation of
all aliens who persecuted any person on the basis of race, reli-
gion, national origin, or political opinion, under the direction of
the Nazi government of Germany or its allies. 5 6 The Act also
removes the availability of voluntary departure under section 244
(e)15 7 and precludes the withholding of deportation for persecu-
tion claims under section 243 (h).158
The federal courts have recently decided two cases dealing with
deportation procedures. In United States v. Calderon-Medina,159
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the INS that a de-
fendant in a criminal prosecution for unauthorized reentry after
deportation can collaterally attack the validity of the underlying
deportation order. 60 However, the court reversed and remanded,
holding that the INS' failure to notify a detained alien of his right
to communicate with his country's diplomatic officers161 does not
invalidate the underlying deportation order in the absence of a
showing of prejudice to the alien.162
The second case, Gonzalez v. Vician,163 involved a native and
citizen of the Dominican Republic who entered the United States
at San Juan, Puerto Rico, in 1975 without a valid immigrant visa
or other valid entry document. In December, 1975, she gave birth
to an illegitimate son in New York. Petitioner was found to be de-
153. Id. at 865.
154. 585 F.2d at 1317.
155. 92 Stat. 2065 (1978).
156. [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4700.
157. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a) (33), (d) (3), 1251(a) (19) (West Supp. 1979).
158. Id. §§ 1253(h), 1254(c).
159. 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979).
160. Id. at 531.
161. 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(e) (1979). "Every detained alien shall be notified that he
may communicate with the consular of diplomatic officers of the county of his na-
tionality in the United States."
162. 591 F.2d at 529.
163. - F.Supp. -, No. 78 C 1749 (E.D.N.Y., filed Nov. 3, 1978), digested in 55 IN-
TERPRETER RELEASES 518 (1978).
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portable under sections 241(a) (1)164 and 212(a) (20)165 of the INA
and was granted voluntary departure. Alleging that her son
would suffer "irreparable loss" if she left the United States, the
mother petitioned for an extension of voluntary departure, which
was denied. She did not depart as directed and ified suit seeking a
stay of deportation.166
The District Court for the Eastern District of New York found
for petitioner, holding that the rights of the citizen-child include
the right not only to live in this country but also to be cared for by
its natural mother. The court found petitioner worthy of protec-
tion because although she had entered the country illegally, she
had at all times shown great concern for her son and attempted to
preserve his rights as an American. In limiting this decision
strictly to the facts of this case, the court did not provide a loop-
hole for other immigrants.167
The INS and the BIA have issued several significant decisions
in the area of deportation procedures. In In re Yuet Sun Lee,168
the INS set forth the standards to be followed in determining
whether an alien should be allowed to reapply for admission after
deportation under section 212. The court considered the following
to be relevant: 1) applicant's moral character;16 9 2) recency of de-
164. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1) (1976). "Any alien in the United States shall upon or-
der of the Attorney General, be deported who, (1) at the time of entry was within
one or more of the classes of aliens excludable by the law existing at the time of
such entry. .. "
165. Id. § 1182(a) (20) (1976).
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the following classes of
aliens shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from ad-
mission into the United States:
(20) ... any immigrant who at the time of application for admission is
not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, bor-
der crossing identification card, or other valid entry document required by
this chapter, and a valid unexpired passport, or other suitable travel docu-
ment, or document of identity or nationality, if such document is required
under the regulations issued by the Attorney General....
166. 55 INTERPRETER RELEASES 518, 518 (1978).
167. Id. at 519. See Jong Shik Choe v. INS, 597 F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1979).
168. I.D. No. -, File A-16027182 (filed Dec. 21, 1978), digested in 56 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 10 (1979).
169. "A record of immigration violations, standing alone, will not conclusively
support a finding of lack of good moral character. However, an evinced callous at-
titude toward violating the immigration laws without a hint of reformation of char-
acter should be considered as a heavily weighted adverse factor." 56 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 10 (1979).
portation; 70 3) need for alien services in the United States;'17 4)
length of residence in the United States; 7 2 and 5) hardship in-
volved to himself and others.173 The Commissioner indicated that
in applying these factors, any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the alien. Congress developed sections 212(a) (16) and (17)174 to
provide remedial relief, and they should not be construed as puni-
tive. 75
In In re Garcia,7 6 the BIA clarified a recent decision, In re
Kotte,177 and set forth the general proposition that when a visa
petition and adjustment application are simultaneously filed, de-
portation proceedings should be continued pending adjudication
of the visa petition.178 In Garcia, an immigration judge found the
respondent deportable as an overstayed visitor under section
241(a) (2) of the INA.179 The judge denied suspension of deporta-
tion and granted voluntary departure. Respondent's appeal was
dismissed by the BIA.180 Thereafter, respondent's wife, a citizen,
filed a visa petition in an effort to accord him immediate relative
status under section 201(b).181 Respondent simultaneously filed
an application for adjustment of status under section 245.182
Treating the adjustment application as a motion to reopen the de-
portation proceedings,183 the District Director transmitted the
unadjudicated visa petition and adjustment application to the BIA
with the administrative record. The BIA granted the motion to re-
open and remanded the record to the immigration judge for fur-
170. Ordinarily when the cause for deportation has been removed and the
alien appears eligible for a visa, the recency of the deportation should not
be considered ... when there is a finding of poor moral character, based
on moral turpitude in conduct... which evinces a callous conscience. In
such circumstances, there must be a measurable reformation of character
over a period of time, to properly assess the alien's ability to integrate into
society.
Id.
171. "Where the alien will provide services to the public in a job category
where sufficient workers in the United States are not available, this is a favorable
factor in his behalf." Id.
172. 'This is a favorable factor only where the residence is pursuant to a lawful
admission or adjustment of status as a permanent resident." Id.
173. Consideration should be given to applicant's family and hardship which
may result to them if permission to reapply is not granted. See In re Tin, 14 1. & N.
Dec. 371 (1973); In re Chin, 14 L & N. Dec. 357 (1973).
174. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (16), (17) (1976).
175. 56 INTERPRETER RELEASES 11 (1979).
176. I.D. No. 2684 (1978).
177. I.D. No. 2634 (1978).
178. ID. No. 2684 (1978).
179. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2) (1976).
180. I.D. No. 2684, at 2.
181. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1976).
182. Id. § 1255.
183. 8 C.F.R. § 242.22 (1979).
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ther proceedings.184 In the earlier case of In re Kotte,1 85 the BIA
had held that an immigration judge is not required to continue a
deportation hearing pending adjudication by the District Director
of the visa petition.186 In reexamining its position in light of
amendment to the regulation 87 to permit simultaneous filing of
both visa petition and adjustment application, the BIA concluded:
"In order to give what we consider to be appropriate effect to the
simultaneous filing provisions of 8 C.F.R. § 245.2 (a) (2), as
amended, we shall hereafter generally reopen the deportation
proceedings in such cases unless clear ineligibility is apparent in
the record."' 88
The BIA was careful, however, to qualify its decision and cau-
tioned that no inflexible rule was intended. An immigration judge
could still summarily deny a request for continuance or motion to
reopen if he determined that the visa petition was frivolous or
that the adjustment application would be denied on statutory
grounds or in the exercise of discretion, even if the visa petition
were approved.189
In In re Mendel,90 a case of first impression, the INS held that
an alien who has not engaged in proscribed employment since his
last entry, but who on a previous stay engaged in unauthorized
employment, is barred from adjustment of status by section
245(c) of the INA.191 The Commissioner held that even though
the alien had departed from the United States since his unautho-
rized employment, his departure and subsequent return were not
sufficient to "wipe the slate clean" with respect to eligibility for
adjustment of status under section 245.192
The BIA, in In re Cheung,193 overruled In re S-Y-L,194 which
184. I.D. No. 2684, at 7 (1978).
185. I.D. No. 2634 (1978).
186. Id. at 5.
187. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a) (2) (1979).
188. I.D. No. 2684, at 3 (1978).
189. Id. at 6.
190. No. -, File A-22289884 (filed May 4, 1979), digested in 56 INTERPRETER RE-
LEASES 262 (1979).
191. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c) (1976). "The provisions of this section (adjustment of
status) shall not be applicable to... an alien... who hereafter continues in or
accepts unauthorized employment prior to filing an application for adjustment of
status. .. ."
192. 56 INTERPRETER RELEASES 263 (1979).
193. LD. No. 2693 (1979).
194. 9 L & N. Dec. 575 (1962).
designated the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China
or Taiwan as appropriate for deportation purposes.195 The BIA
based this action on the recent recognition by the United States
of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of
China. Most Chinese aliens in the United States are from Taiwan
or refugees from the mainland. This action will probably result in
an increase in claims for asylum from Chinese who are found de-
portable.
REFUGEES AND AsyLuM
An area of immigration law which has been the subject of in-
creased interest and recent publicity is the rules and regulations
controlling the flow of refugees and claims for asylum. With the
recent revolution in Iran and the much publicized plight of the
"Boat People" of Indochina, changes in the treatment of refugees
will be a continuous process.196
In an action effective March 6, 1979, the INS issued amended
regulations relating to the adjustment of status for certain aliens
paroled into the United States.197 The first amendment to the reg-
ulations enables an alien, paroled into the United States as a refu-
gee prior to September 30, 1980, to adjust his status to that of a
permanent resident after residing in this country for two years. 98
Prior regulations did not provide for adjustment of status for refu-
gees, although they did allow a "conditional entrant" to adjust sta-
tus after two years residence but only to a classification where a
visa number was available.199
The second amendment to the regulations permits certain
aliens to have their date of permanent residence rolled back to
the date of parole into the United States. These aliens must have
been paroled in as refugees prior to September 30, 1980, and must
have acquired status as lawful permanent residents under some
other provision of law.200 This provision would allow a permanent
resident to qualify for naturalization two years sooner.
The INS has also issued regulations, effective May 10, 1979, gov-
erning the processing and adjudication of asylum claims in both
195. I). No. 2693 (1979).
196. See H.R. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 1326 (1979); H.R. 3610,
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 2243 (1979); H.R. 4633, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
125 CONG. REC. 5278 (1979); S. 643, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 2630 (1979).
All are proposals to modify the treatment of refugees under the immigration laws.
197. 44 Fed. Reg. 12,157 (1979).
198. Id.
199. 8 C.F.R. § 235.9(c) (1978).
200. 44 Fed. Reg. 12,157 (1979).
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exclusion and deportation proceedings.20 In exclusion proceed-
ings, the District Director will retain jurisdiction over asylum
claims submitted by only three classes of applicants at seaports
or airports: crewmen, stowaways, and aliens temporarily ex-
cluded under section 235 of the INA.202 All other claims submit-
ted by aliens not yet admitted to the United States will be heard
and determined by immigration judges.20 3
In deportation proceedings, the District Director retains juris-
diction over asylum claims in only two categories: aliens who are
within the United States and maintaining a lawful status and
aliens whose presence in the United States is authorized by the
INS. Once deportation proceedings begin, an asylum request will
be considered an application for withholding of deportation and
will be heard and adjudicated by an immigration judge.204 In both
exclusion and deportation proceedings, the asylum claim and sup-
porting evidence will be submitted to the State Department's Of-
fice of Refugee and Migration Affairs for its views. The hearing
will be deferred for not more than thirty days pending receipt of
the State Department's response. 205
Legislation has been proposed in both Houses of Congress
which would increase the number of refugees entering the United
States. 206 The proposals, initiated by the Administration, would
eliminate the seventh preference category. New provisions would
be added for refugees, including a new definition of refugee status
conforming to the United Nations Protocol. 2 07 The worldwide ceil-
ing, exclusive of refugees, would be set at 270,000 annually. The
six percent formerly allocated to seventh preference would be ad-
201. Id. at 21,253-59 (1979).
202. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (1976). This section provides for detention by immigration
officers for inspection.
203. 44 Fed. Reg. 21,258 (1978).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 21,259 (1979).
206. S. 643, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 2630 (1979), H.R. 2816, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 1326 (1979).
207. The term refugee means any person who is outside any country of his
nationality, or in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any
country in which he last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwill-
ing to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protec-
tion of, that country because of persecution or a well founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a par-
ticular social group, or political opinion.
S. 643, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 2631 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1979).
ded to second preference. "Normal flow" refugees 2OB would be al-
lowed a maximum of 50,000 places annually. Refugees would be
exempt from LPC and labor certification requirements and would
be admitted as immigrants. A maximum of 5,000 slots would be
available for adjustment of status by refugees physically present
in the United States for at least two years. In addition, the Attor-
ney General would be authorized, upon Presidential determina-
tion, to admit conditionally to the United States an unlimited
number of "emerging situation" refugees.209 An amendment to
section 243(h) would authorize withholding deportation of an
alien to any country where the alien's life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, or mem-
bership in a particular social group or political opinion. The lan-
guage in existing section 243(h) referring to an alien "within the
United States" is omitted from the Administration's bill. Presum-
ably this would extend its reach to allen parolees or applicants for
admission.210
In an important asylum case, Chen Chaun-Fa v. Kiley,211 the
District Court for the Southern District of New York held that
neither section 279 of the INA212 nor 28 U.S.C. § 1331213 confers ju-
risdiction on the district courts to review denial of an asylum ap-
plication under 8 C.F.R. § 108.214 The court, noting that the INA
confers only limited jurisdiction on the district courts, stated that
"the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of
all causes, civil and criminal, arising under any of the provisions
of, this subchapter."2 15 Because this section appears in sub-
chapter H of the INA, the jurisdiction of the district courts is lim-
ited to claims arising under subchapter H. Because the statutory
basis of the asylum claims was contained in the first subchapter
of the Act, the court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.2 16
208. The number of refugees that would normally be expected to enter the
United States in a year. Id.
209. Refugees in excess of the "normal flow" number, seeking to enter the
United States because of an unforeseen circumstance such as war, revolution, or
natural disaster. Id.
210. 56 INTERPRETER RELEASES 288-89 (1979). Alien parolees and applicants for
admission are not technically within the United States for purposes of the immigr-
tion laws. However, the Administration's Refugee Bill does not make this techni-
cal distinction and would apply to these groups.
211. 459 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
212. 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (1976).
213. Amount in controversy requirement for federal jurisdiction.
214. 459 F. Supp. at 764.
215. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (1976)).
216. 459 F. Supp. at 764.
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CONCLUSION
The changes in the immigration laws during the past year have
been so extensive and varied that it is difficult to identify a direc-
tion in the entire body of law. Specific areas of the immigration
laws, however, evidence definite trends. Two areas, the laws reg-
ulating the employment of aliens and the laws controlling the
treatment of refugees and claims for asylum, should prove to be
interesting.
In the regulation of the employment of aliens, Congress is at-
tempting to make it more difficult to employ illegal workers. Pro-
posed legislation seeks to impose criminal penalities on the
employers of illegal aliens and deny those employers the income
tax deduction for wages paid to illegal workers. In the control of
refugees and asylum claims, the trend is toward a liberalization of
the laws. The Administration's Refugee Bill will not only admit
more refugees, it will give the refugees immigrant status. This is
a marked change from the current position of refugees, which is
one of nonstatus.
These two areas of the imnnigration laws are also unique be-
cause more than any other they are heavily influenced by outside
interests. World opinion has already had a dramatic affect on
United States policy toward refugees and will probably continue
to do so, as long as the "Boat People" or similar groups exist. Pol-
icies regulating the entry of aliens for employment, especially
from Mexico, will be guided by United States desires to become
closely allied with that country's government. Thus, an under-
standing of the world situation is helpful in analyzing changes in
the immigration laws.
The immigration laws of the United States are constantly un-
dergoing change. Although the constant changes make it difficult
to keep current, it is hoped that this Comment will provide a
starting point in researching current issues dealing with immigra-
tion in the United States.
ANTHONy J. PASSANTE, JR.

